Mereologies as the Grammars of Chemical Discourses by Harré, Rom & Llored, Jean-Pierre
27 August 2009
Mereologies as the Grammars of Chemical Discourses
ROM HARRÉ AND JEAN-PIERRE LLORED
`If you cut  a crumb in half do you have two new crumbs or two halves of a crumb?’ 
John Palmer, quoted in the Sunday Times, 28 June 2009, News Review, p. 16.
Since Robert Boyle’s corpuscularian philosophy, chemistry has been a mereological science. 
Displacing the metaphysics of `continuous substances’ and `qualities’ as the expression of 
“principles”, chemistry has been built on a `part-whole’ metaphysics. The grammar for the use 
of  `part-whole’  concepts  is  mereology.  Taking  chemistry  to  be  the  science  of  the 
transformation of substances by the manipulation of their constituent material parts which are 
also bits of discrete substances, the elements, this science seems to fit the concepts of classical 
mereology neatly.   The scheme has  served as  a popular  and pedagogical   foundation for 
chemical concepts and explanations in traditional chemical discourse. A sodium atom is a part 
of a molecule of sodium carbonate and also a part of the extended material substance, the 
element sodium.
However,  chemistry  has  long  since  ceased  to  be  based  on  a  simple  Boylean 
metaphysics. From a metaphysical point of view the Boylean picture has been subverted by 
Earley’s (2004) arguments in favour of a process metaphysical foundation, which is naturally 
tied in with such notions as causal powers and affordances. From the point of view of working 
chemists  the  appearance  of  molecular  orbitals  as  an  account  of  the  binding  processes  of 
molecules also subverts important aspects of  Boyle’s ontology. In this paper we want to track 
the developments in chemistry in relation to the presumptions of a variety of mereologies, 
grammars of chemical discourses, taking account of these developments. 
Our argument is based on the identification of variations in both of the `poles’ of the 
Part - Whole relation. 
A. Differences in Wholes: 
i.  Dissipative wholes in which material  constituents change within a 
stable  structure  of  processes  in  contrast  to  wholes  in  which  the  parts  are 
material beings self-identical over time.
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ii.  Structural  wholes  in  which  the  parts  are  components  of  stable 
structures in contrast to amorphous wholes. 
B. Differences in parts:
i. Those for which criteria of identity are independent of the wholes of 
which they are parts.
ii. Those for which criteria of identity are conceptually related to the 
whole of which they are parts.
Instances of chemical discourses in which all four contrasts are salient will be identified and 
proposals  for the mereological principles necessitated will be examined. 
Mereologies as Systems of Formal Rules
The idea that the part-whole relationship was of sufficient importance to warrant a special 
branch of logic is due to the work of Stanislaus Lesniewski (for Lesniewski’s mereology see 
Simons, 2000: §2.6). Before turning to the recent discussion of the details of the idea that the 
grammar  of  discourses  concerning  chemically  relevant  substances  is  mereology,  that  is 
implies an ontology of wholes consisting of distinguishable parts, which themselves consist of 
distinguishable  parts,  it  is  worth  reminding  ourselves  of  the  basic  principles  of  general 
mereology  and  sketching  some  of  the  debates  about  the  way  these  principles  should  be 
deployed.
Classical Mereological Principles
Two main mereological principles more or less define the system of mereological rules for 
discontinuous substances and their parts, in which the whole is uniform, and unstructured. We 
will refer to this system as the C-mereology. 
The Principle  of Unique Composition: There is  a unique being,  the sum or  `fusion’ of  a 
certain collection of beings, of which every such being is a part and which has no parts other 
than such a part. So, for example, a certain actual chemical molecule is a unique collection of 
just these chemical atoms, and only these chemical atoms. We note that the composition of 
such a collection does not serve to uniquely identify a molecule as a being of certain kind – 
the properties of molecules include structures as well as components. In practice we need to 
recognise  the  difference  between  `disparate  sums’,  that  is  wholes  the  parts  of  which 
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instantiate different categories or types and uniform sums in which the parts are all of the 
same category or type. [Axiom MA3 in Simons (2000)]. 
There are some difficult questions about how category distinctions are managed in 
mereology. This reminds one of the legendary Japanese tax collector who charged the poor 
peasants for three items, the bull, the cow and the pair of cattle.  We shall call the addition of a 
whole level concept to the list of parts the `Japanese tax collector fallacy’. 
The Principle of Mereological Transitivity: If B is a part of A and C is a part of B, then C is a 
part of A. [Simons (2000), Axiom MA2]. 
Various exceptions  have been offered to this principle. Some turn on the issue of the 
way a component is a part of the being of which it is a component or part.  A gear wheel is a 
part of a gear box, but is a tooth of that gear wheel a part of the gear box in the same way? If 
we include function among the attributes that define how a being is a constituent of another 
being, that is how it is a part, then clearly a tooth is a part of a gear wheel in a different way 
from the way a gear wheel is part of a gear box, and transitivity of that part-whole relation 
fails. Each has a quite different functional relationship to the whole of which it is a part. This 
observation leads on to the need to formulate a second mereology, one in which the principles 
include structural-functional relations.
Functional Mereological Principles
Even though constituents lose their actualised functional attributes when removed from the 
whole of which they have been parts, they do not cease to exist. Nor do they lose the core 
attributes  that  enabled  them to  count  as  parts  of  the  relevant  whole.  In  the  light  of  our 
knowledge  of  how  a  component  fits  into  a  whole  we  may  want  to  hold  that  potential 
functionality survives some ways of decomposing the original whole.  For example setting 
fire  to  a  chair  is  a  mode  of  decomposition  into  parts  that  does  not  preserved  potential 
functionality.
Consider the parts of a chair – qua material objects but not identified as beings of certain 
kinds by the criteria of carpenters. They continue to exist and have all their material attributes, 
size, shape, weight etc as bits of wood when the chair is disassembled.
However, they do not preserve their formerly occurrent functional attributes after 
disassembly – chair parts move from actual to potential functions, e.g. the seat was actually 
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then and there supporting the weight of sitter, but detached from the frame that function is 
only potential. Turning to an essentially Aristotelian view of the scope of usable categories we 
note that  chemical synthesis  creates temporary dispositions that allow chemists  to lift  the 
reacting systems over the required energy thresholds. As we shall see, Mullikan’s work allows 
us to maintain the dynamical  point of view of the mereology we will be developing in this 
paper.
This aspect of wholes has been discussed by Rescher and Oppenheim aeons ago 
(1955). They suggest three conditions on wholes: a whole must possess an attribute that is 
peculiar to it as a whole; the parts of a whole must stand in some special relationship to one 
another;  a whole must have a structure.
The above analysis  seems to presuppose the concept of an emergent property fully to 
describe  the  whole  of  which  functionally  specified  components  are  parts.  To  ascribe  a 
function to a chair leg makes sense only if the assemblage of chair parts has a structure which 
endows these parts as assembled with certain causal powers, such as the ability to support the 
weight of a person. In general, emergent properties do not satisfy the mereological principle 
of transitivity.
Set theoretical Mereological Principles.
Lewis begins his sketch of the basic principles of set theoretical mereology with an example 
to illustrate the concept of `fusion’ and `sum’. It falls somewhere between the examples of 
continuous and discontinuous wholes above. `The fusion of all cats is that large, scattered 
chunk of cat-stuff which is composed of all the cats there are, and nothing else’ (Lewis, 1991: 
1).  Neither past cats nor future cats are parts of the cat-fusion. Simons’s concept of `fusion’ is 
different from that of Lewis. For Lewis `sum’, that is `all the cats’, is the same as `fusion’. For 
Simons some bunch of cats taken as a whole is a fusion, though it may not include all the cats. 
So there may be several cat-fusions. Assuming transitivity Lewis remarks that the parts of cats 
are also parts of the cat-fusion. This allows Lewis to distinguish the class of cats from the 
fusion of cats – the mereological attributes of lots of cats from their set theoretical attributes. 
Since the member of a member of a set is not in general a member of that set, membership is 
not the same relation as part to whole. However, Lewis does allow that classes do have parts, 
their subclasses (Lewis, 1991: 3). So there is the possibility of a mereologised set theory, or a 
set-theoretical mereology
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He  proposes  several  mereological  principles  for  sets  and  their  relations  to 
individuals  (Lewis,  1991:  7). Using  the  concept  of  a  `fusion’,  Lewis  refines  the  simple 
Lesniewskian scheme with additional principles for a set theoretical mereology (Lewis, 1991: 
74). 
1. Transitivity: If x is a part of some part of y, then x is a part of y.
2. Unrestricted Composition: Whenever there are some things, then there exists a fusion of 
those things.
3.  Uniqueness  of  Composition:  It  never  happens that  the  same things  have  two different 
fusions.
Then he sets out the way mereological concepts are to be given a set-theoretical interpretation, 
that is mapped on to the part – whole distinction.
4.One class is a part of another if and only if the first is a subclass of the second.
6. No class has any part that is not a class.
7. Reality divides exhaustively into individuals and classes.
8. No class is part of an individual.
9. Any fusion of individuals is an individual.
Chemists with stereo-isomers, carbohydrates and so on in mind will surely find the principle 
of uniqueness of composition unintuitive, and inadequate to chemical part-whole reasoning. 
Lewis’s mereology of sets (to be called the S-mereology) sidelines structure and so already 
leaves itself open to counter-examples to its principles from chemistry.
Choosing  a Mereology for Chemical Discourses.
Chemical discourse is largely based on a distinction, hard won it is true, between elements, 
compounds and mixtures. It  is evidently structured by mereological concepts.  Clearly ion-
cores are parts of elements in different way from that in which they are parts of compounds. 
Elements  are  uniform fusions  or  sums  of  nuclei  atoms,  identified  by  atomic  number,  Z. 
Compounds are disparate sums, because in general the constituents of molecules include ion-
cores from different elements or more exactly from their isotopes as well. Mixtures are also 
disparate  fusions  or  sums but  the  parts  are  not  causally  related  into  relatively permanent 
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structures, nor is there a determinate proportionality among the parts of a mixture. 
But which version of mereology should we prefer? Classical mereology makes use of 
the lowest level of the current hierarchy of beings in the relations of parts  and wholes – 
things, generally spatio-temporally distinct beings with both criteria of numerical identity and 
of qualitative identity. Two kinds of classical mereological discourses have been distinguished 
according to whether their several mereological regresses terminate in atoms, in the traditional 
sense of beings with no proper parts, or do not terminate, every proper part at each level itself 
having proper parts. A proper part is a part that it not identical to the whole of which it is a 
part. We have suggested that classical axiomatic mereology can be extended to include rules 
for the use of a whole – part relation for contexts in which the parts are functionally distinct 
relative to the whole of which they form parts. In the absence of the concept of the whole, for 
example a chair, the shapes of the parts, for example, are mereologically irrelevant to their 
role as parts  of that whole. The mereology of functionally defined parts in contrast to an 
atomic  mereology  should  fit  the  logic  of  discourses  featuring  compounds  while  atomic 
mereology should fit the logic of discourses about mixtures. 
Moreover, atoms are also parts of distributed elements. Is a sodium atom a part of the 
element sodium in the way that a horse is part of a herd of horses? Very few elements exist as 
chunks of well-bounded and uniform stuff – diamonds as chunks of carbon or nuggets as 
chunks of gold  perhaps? This question is made more complicated by Earley’s argument in 
favour of a discourse of `ion-cores’ rather than the atoms of Boyle and Dalton.
Faced with this tidy scheme the question for a philosopher of chemistry is whether the 
key chemical concepts of substance, element, molecule, atom, subatomic particle, field and so 
on fit, at least in part, on to the logic of classes, set theory, or on to the principles of classical 
mereology. Is the element `sodium’ the set of all sodium atoms, or the mereological fusion of 
all sodium atoms? Is there a mereologised set-theoretical way of distinguishing mixtures from 
compounds?
What difference would it make which way we jumped to explicate the forms of 
reasoning available to chemists?  Does the chemical fact that the sodium atoms in the universe 
exist as a fusion which includes chunks of sodium metal and that they also seem to exist in 
ionic form as a fusion when arranged in a lattice with chloride ions in a lump of common salt 
throw doubts on the application of Lewis Axiom c to chemistry?
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However, Lewis does introduce an ontologically and mereologically significant 
concept in the `singleton’, the single membered class. Set theory requires the possibility of 
empty classes that collectively constitute the null class. This comes about because to specify a 
class one needs an intension, that is the necessary attributes that identify a class member, and 
an extension, that is the members that meet that criterion. There can be a class intension that 
nothing in the real world satisfies. Its extension is null.
Here we have a genuine alternative ontology – are the atomic constituents of molecules single 
member subsets that are parts of molecular sets? 
Mereological Rules for Continuous Substances
In  his  recent  debate  with  Joseph  Earley,  Rodney  Needham  (2005)  sets  out  two  basic 
mereological principles for discourses about substances that are considered to be continuous – 
they have bits but not parts. A lump of gold, not yet wrought into anything shapely, can have 
bits lopped of it, but they are not parts of the lump in the sense that the legs are parts of the 
chair. It makes little sense to ask someone to bring them a part of glass of beer, or of the sea. 
`Bring me some sea water’ does make sense but it would be very odd to say that what is in the 
bucket is a part of the sea, though it is!. Using water as an example and despite the force of 
the vernacular use of the word ‘part’, Needham offers the following:
1.The distributive condition: Whatever is a `part’ [sample] `w’, taken from a body of water, 
`W’ is also water.
2. The cumulative condition: If two things, say the contents of a pair of buckets, are water, 
their sum is water. 
These principles generalise nicely to other mass substances, such as wood and even fire. This 
scheme can be interpreted in terms of the S-mereology. If the parts are subsets of the whole as 
a set, then each bucket of water is a singleton, that is a single membered set. An empty bucket 
is a logical possibility in the task that the Sorcerer’s Apprentice was stuck with – a nothing 
will not do as a `part’ in the C-mereology, but there is no problem with null sets. The bucket 
is, as it were, the intension of the singleton, but it has not extension.
Needham’s principles do very well with the part-whole relation as it appears in the 
traditional chemistry of elements. When we turn to compounds, it is reasonable to consider 
ions  as  parts  of  chemical  substances,  one  molecular  cluster  of  ions  is  enough to  have  a 
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substance  on  hand,  but  they  satisfy  neither  the  distributive  nor  the  cumulative  condition 
above. Any old sodium ion and any old chloride ion as candidate parts of a whole salt crystal 
are not salt.  Here is the case of the part-whole relation requiring a third ingredient, the right 
relation between the parts, in order that the criteria of identity for the relevant whole are met. 
The structure of a molecule is generally a sum of parts which are from different chemical 
elements. If it is, we seem to be faced with the molecule as a `disparate sum’. However, if the 
molecule we are analysing is a diatomic part of an element, for example H2, then the parts are 
numerically distinct but qualitatively identical. This is a uniform fusion, not a disparate sum..
Progression of the mereological principle in chemistry
Earley’s mereological argument: 
The conundrum first proposed by Joseph Earley – what is the mereology of the compounds 
which are ionized in solutions? – subverts the simple mereology of things and their parts, that 
was the model for Boyle’s and Dalton’s conceptions of elements and compounds, atoms and 
molecules. Taking this question further raises the question of the mereological status of the 
constituents of molecules in the light of the molecular orbital theory of Mulliken. This is not 
the  same  question  as  above,  since  Mulliken  queries  the  very  idea  of  atoms  as  parts  of 
molecules, whether fully clothed in electrons or as ion-cores. 
According to Earley, Na+ and Cl- ions are not parts of ionic crystals of salt when 
that  white,  crystalline  sample  of  salt  has  been  dissolved.  However,  their  presence  in  the 
solution determines that the brine will afford salt as a mass substance on the carrying out of 
certain operations on sea water, say evaporating it in a salt pan, and not something else. Thus 
they are at best potential material parts of salt. They are like the legs of chairs in the factory 
store room. 
Here is a problem. Na+ is a potentially a part  or constituent of a possible salt 
crystal  afforded  by  a  saline  solution  when  it  is  in  the  sea.  But  it  is  a  potential  part  of 
component of a possible soap molecule when it is in a solution with HO- ions. However, it is 
neither a bit of salt nor a bit of soap in the way that the salt in the salt cellar is a bit of salt, or 
the cake of Imperial Leather by the shower is a bit of soap. Is an Na+ ion then a part of 
sodium? The relativisation of its mereological status to the mass substance it affords does not 
have an application when the afforded substance is the element of which it is a part. We are 
not sure what should be said about allotropes. A lump of lamp black is a fusion of carbon 
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atoms,  but  so is  a  diamond and fullerene,  a  modern  synthesis.   The  structural  difference 
cannot be a mere ad hoc `add on' to the mereology. Yet, taking sodium ions one by one, they 
do  not  line  up  as  salt  constituents  and  soap  constituents.  The  chemical  and  physical 
environment in which these processes occur is crucial to their mereological status as `parts’ of 
something.
There  seem  to  be  `vertical’  (ion  cores  in  molecules)  and  `horizontal’  (ion-
cores/atoms in elements) part-whole relations in chemistry. The vertical compositions can be 
made sense of only if structure is included as an ineliminable aspect of molecular aggregates. 
`Part of the element sodium’ in what sense? It cannot be in the sense that a horse shoe is a bit 
of Iron, there being a distinguishable stuff with bits scattered all over the universe. However, 
Sodium nowhere exists as a stuff. It exists, so far as we know, only as atomic level instances 
of a type. At this point in the analysis one is reminded of Nelson Goodman’s mereological 
treatment of the relation between instances and the species they instantiate. All the actual 
horses make up the extended concrete universal which is the totality of horses scattered across 
the surface of the Earth (1951) . However, horses can never merge into a mass of horse stuff 
in the way that old cars merge into pig iron in a furnace. A herd of horses is not like a block of 
cast iron. Each horse retains its integrity as an individual, but each old car does not do so in 
the  iron  ingot.  In  classical  chemistry  the  atomic  constituents  of  molecules  were 
mereologically similar to the horses. However, odd things happen to the idea of integrity of 
being in the context of subatomic physics. 
Earley’s analysis demonstrates that the working conceptual system of chemistry, 
with its strong classical mereological underpinnings, does not permit the claim that there is 
salt in the sea, as an ocean of brine. However, is there a parallel argument to show that there is 
no sodium or chlorine in a salt crystal? It seems just as convincing.
Returning to Needham’s subtle analysis of the logical conditions for the use of 
mass  substance  concepts  (Needham,  2005:  109 –  112),  we  note  that  he  makes  use  of  a 
distinction between a Stoic conception of mixtures, in which constituents retain their identity, 
and an Aristotelian conception in which a dissolved substance, e.g. salt, is potentially present 
in the solution as salt, understood as the product of an extraction procedure. Our solution to 
Earley’s paradox in terms of affordances, introduces a concept that occupies a logical slot 
between  the  actuality  of  Stoic  substance  and  the  modal  possibility  or  potentiality  of 
Aristotelian substance. Brine affords salt, but salt is not a mereological part of brine, that is 
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does not satisfy Lesniewski’s axioms. Logically, affordances are attributes, not constituents. 
Brine contains the constituents of salt, hence it can afford salt, but it does not contain salt in 
either  the  Stoic  or  the  Aristotelian  conception  of  a  substance  as  constituent.  The  store 
cupboard contains the ingredients for a cake, but it does not contain any actual or potential 
cakes. The potentiality or cake affordances are not potential cakes. The logical distinction we 
need is between substances and attributes. Affordances are attributes not substances, so they 
are not parts of anything.
The argument so far
Does it make any sense at all to ask if elements and their atomic constituents and molecules 
and their atomic components could be treated as sets? If so there is room for mereological set 
theory à la Lewis as an alternative grammar for chemicals discourses.
The Case for S-mereology
The case  for  adopting  set  theory  as  the  Mereology for  chemistry  begins  with  the 
predictions by Odling and Mendeleev (c.f. Scerri, 2008) of the properties of elements yet to 
be discovered. At the time of their proposals only the intensions of the set of atoms of eka-
iodine was available in chemical discourse. The set had a null extension for the users of the 
grammar appropriate to the situation as it  then stood, since the set  had no members,  and 
conceivably might never have any. Obviously there cannot be a fusion or a sum of which 
there are no parts.  To talk of eka-iodine in the grammar of classical Mereology made no 
sense. It does seem to make sense in a discourse in which the parts of sets are subsets. 
Are  hydrogen  and  oxygen  atoms  subsets  of  the  water  molecule  set?  Each  water 
molecule would be a subset of the superset, the stuff water. However, what is the intension of 
the set of which two sets, a pair of hydrogen atoms and a singleton oxygen atom are the 
subsets? Well,  it  is  the properties of whatever  it  takes to  be a subset of the set  of water 
molecules that is the water stuff. The hydrogen atoms are members of the set of all hydrogen 
atoms, while the oxygen atom  is a member of the set of all oxygen atoms. Does this have any 
advantage  over  the  classical  mereological  grammar?  That  it  does  not  is  evident  from a 
problem which we note in passing but do not address here – is a single H2O molecule properly 
to be called water? Following Needham (2005) we need to introduce mereologies sensitive to 
scale.
The Case for the C-mereology
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The  first  argument  for  the  C-mereology  depends  on  the  possibility  of  a  whole  having 
emergent  properties  as  a  result  of  some structural  invariants.  A set  only  accidentally  has 
structural  properties  because  it  is  a  conceptual  object.  A whole  has  structural  properties 
because is a material entity, with real relations between its parts. Sets are held together by 
similarity  relations,  not  by  real  relations  between  the  parts  of  wholes  such  as  material 
connectivity (the parts of a chair) or causality, the parts of a molecule. A set can have only 
similar members, while a whole can have dissimilar parts. A set is a logical object while a 
whole is a material object.
The second argument for C-mereology depends on the criteria for class membership 
that is the intensionality component of the set concept. If H+ and O2-  are subsets of the water 
molecule set what is their common property that makes them members of this set? It can only 
be  that  they  are  constituents  of  a  water  molecule.   Hence  the  S-mereology  treatment  of 
chemical  unity  in  multiplicity  depends on a  C-mereological  understanding of  the  relation 
between atoms (ions) and the molecules of which they are parts.  
In  the  grammar  of  classical  Mereology,  the  three  atoms  are  the  parts  of  a  water 
molecule which is their (disparate) fusion or sum. The water in the sea is the mereological 
fusion of certain water molecules as parts. But it is not the sum of water molecules, which is a 
being of much greater dimensions being all the water molecules there are. A bucket of brine 
as a part of the sea is a fusion of the water molecules which are its parts. As Earley has argued 
the same does not apply to the Na+ and Cl- ions in the sea. Here we need to supplement C-
mereology with dispositional concepts as illustrated in the simple case of the parts of the 
chair. The concept of the whole, the chair, cannot be eliminated from the criteria for ascribing 
dispositional properties to the chair parts.
However, the C-mereology does very well for the grammar of discourses about 
mixtures.  A mixture  is  a  collectivity  or  aggregate which  includes  more  than  one kind of 
substance.  If we allow `disparate sums’ as a legitimate mereological concept then mixtures 
are clearly sums or fusions. Mixtures rarely have emergent properties. Their constituents are 
not causally related nor do they have invariant structures. A sack of sand and cement consists 
of  causally  unrelated  and independent  molecules  of  silicon  oxide  and calcium carbonate. 
When water is added complex chemical reactions begin and the mixture ceases to exist. The 
mortar that comes into being has emergent properties, such as tensile strength, that a scoop of 
dry sand and cement does not have. A silicon oxide molecule can be a mereological part of a 
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bag of sand and cement, but when that bag of cement becomes a part of a block of concrete of 
which the other part is water, the transitivity principle becomes problematic because none of 
the  silicon  oxide  molecules  have  the  emergent  properties  of  the  mortar.  In  general,  the 
transitivity  principle  is  in  conflict  with  the  appearance  of  chemically  relevant  emergent 
properties.
Mereological  Presumptions  in  the  Historical  Analysis  of  the  Concept  of  `Molecular 
Orbital’
The progression of the grammar of chemical discourse concerning molecules considered with 
respect to their mereological constituents goes something like this: the classical account of a 
molecule was of a disparate fusion of atoms sustained by their individual combining power. 
About a hundred years ago this modulated into the shared electron theory as the source of 
bonding, with the perfect octet as the grounding concept. Each electron `orbited’ the nucleus 
of its own atom since it was a defining constituent of that atom. Thus the `shell’ architecture 
of sodium with its nuclear cluster  of protons and neutrons defined the element. So far so 
Earley-ish. A crystal of salt contains sodium in the same way that a bucket of brine contains 
salt – that is it  affords sodium, for example in Davy-style electrolysis, just as evaporation 
forces the bucket of brine to afford salt.  However the advent of molecular orbital theory, such 
as that of Mulliken (1981), requires a more radical mereological grammar. Even ion-cores 
lose their  thing-like status. According to Mulliken (Ramsay and Hinze, 1932: 451) `Attempts 
to regard a molecule as consisting of specific atoms or ionic units held together by discrete  
numbers  of  bonding  electrons  or  electron  pairs  are  regarded  [by  me]  as  more  or  less  
meaningless’. So, following Mulliken’s thought, we would say that there are no atoms in a 
salt crystal, for the same reason as there is no salt in the sea, though Mulliken’s studies began 
with  binding  in  covalent  molecules.  Electrons  as  constituents  of  molecular  orbitals  as  an 
image of electronic density energy distributions are not related to the nuclei of constituent 
atoms, but to duplets, triplets etc., the paired or tripled etc nuclei at the core of the molecule. 
Formally, molecular orbitals are linear combinations of atomic orbitals, but the atoms that 
define these wave functions do not actually exist. Mulliken’s view seems to be that they are 
scaffolding to provide the models needed to arrive at the consequential molecular orbitals and 
to explain molecular spectra. However, the electrolysis of molten NaCl affords sodium atoms 
in plenty because it affords the sodium nuclei that are essential to the formation of sodium, 
atom by atom. There is no sodium in salt, but salt affords sodium.
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In  proposing  a  change  of  terminology  from  `orbit  to  `orbital  Mulliken 
(1932)reassigns the electro-mechanical model of the atom as a basis for an explanation of 
atomic spectra to a heuristic role. We can be quite agnostic about whether electrons are little 
things  whizzing  round  a  nuclear  `sun’.   So  far  Mulliken’s   proposal  upsets  simplistic 
applications  of  C   or  S-metrological  rules  to  `atomic  chemistry’.  However,  the  role  of 
electrons in binding atomic units into molecules, when interpreted within Mulliken  molecular 
orbital  approximation (or approach),  upsets  the mereology of atoms as well.  Or to out in 
another way, this approach undercuts the simplistic idea of atoms as simple constituents of 
molecules.  This seems to open the way for a revised mereology of affordances à la Earley. 
Molecules afford atoms though atoms are not simple molecular constituents.
Just as `electron’ ceases to be literally the name of a moving body, so `atom’ 
ceases  to  be  literally  the  name  of  a  molecular  constituent.  If  molecular  spectra  can  be 
explained by molecular `orbitals’ then the case is more or less made. Mulliken makes use of 
the concept of `atom’ in two distinct but linked ways. The concept of `atom’ is a conceptual 
tool which makes it possible to unify multiple relations betweenempirical data, particularly 
spectra.  Mulliken’s  diagrams bring about a synthesis of the experimental data and certain 
theoretical models thanks to the mediator concept of `atom’.  These diagrams allow a great 
number of forecasts not only about the spectral states of the molecules but also as regards 
their physical properties. They make it possible moreover to study the formation of molecules 
without alluding to a supposed intrinsic valency of the atoms.
The same account can be given of the role of the concept of `electron’.  It plays a 
heuristic role through the concept of binding capacity of electrons. Mulliken makes use of the 
process  of  molecular  dynamics  to  try  to  rationalize  molecular  reactivity.  The  heuristic 
character of the explanations which he proposes is  undeniable but it  is not all.  Using the 
`manipulation’ criterion  on  which  to  base  claims  for  existence  Mulliken  points  out  that 
electrons exist because they can be acted upon by electromagnetic radiation, the interaction 
having  observable  consequences  (Harré,  1996).  An  electron  has  a  relational  capacity  to 
interact with various nuclei plus other electrons in a molecular orbit. The consequences of 
acting upon electrons are displayed by means of spectroscopy. Mulliken does not believe in 
electrons because he seeks a theory of the structure of matter but because they can be acted 
upon electromagnetically. Such effects at the electron level as lengthening of the internuclear 
distances  in  a  molecule,  change  of  the  angles  of  connection,  evolution  of  energies  of 
dissociation and so on, have spectroscopic effects. Mulliken is looking for whatever causal 
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capacities are at  the origin of the molecular phenomena. He tries to quantify the binding 
capacity of electrons via many spectral studies thanks to the lever of electronic configuration. 
Mulliken  believed  that  this  binding  capacity is  related  to  the  stability  and  the 
reactivity  of  the molecules  i.e.  on their  capacity  to  act  on other  molecules.  He tried to 
measure the capacity  of electrons to be put  in relation with nuclei or electrons of other 
molecules to produce chemical phenomena. Spectroscopy makes it possible for Mulliken to 
evaluate this reactive capacity of electrons and to propose ways of envisaging the properties 
of the molecules starting from analogies between the atomic and molecular spectral states. 
He specifies that (1931): “we should regard a single bonding electron as the natural unit of  
bonding, an anti-bonding electron as a negative unit ”.
Using the expression `diatomic molecule’ for  such a thing as  a molecule of 
HCl or H2 suggests that the mereological analysis of these complex entities should lead us to 
say that the parts of such molecules are hydrogen and chlorine atoms. However, Mulliken’s 
solution to the problem of how atoms are bound into molecules involves electron orbits that 
are  not  centred  on  the  nuclei  of  the  constituent  atoms.  Instead  the  wave function  for  an 
electron becomes molecule centred, the paired nuclei serving as the reference for the model 
interpretation of the new orbital as a linear function of the wave equations for each electron 
considered with respect to each of the apparently constituent nuclei. If the criterion of identity 
for an atom or the ionic residue of such an atom, is the composition of the electron shells then 
these criteria could not be satisfied by the components of a complex molecule. The relevant 
nuclei form a doublet which, speaking in the accent of Mulliken, are a unit without parts, 
using  the  molecular  orbital  theory  of  electrons  as  the  criterion  for  an  individual  part.  A 
molecule does not have atoms or ions or even the nuclei of ions as its parts.  It does have 
nuclei  duplets  however,  identified  as  molecular  parts  with  respect  to  molecular  orbitals. 
Furthermore, Mulliken’s fragment method (1933) emphasizes the arbitrariness of defining the 
parts.  Two fragments can interact provided they have the same kind of symmetry and that the 
energy gap, measured by spectroscopy, is not too high. For the ethylene molecule “C2H4”, he 
considers  two  fragments  “CH2”  and  determines  suitable  molecular  orbital  by  using  the 
irreducible  representations  of  ethylene.  In  doing  so,  he  grasps  all  the  characteristics  of 
molecular  orbital  diagram  of  the  ethylene  molecule.  The  possibility  of  an  experimental 
support was all the more important as the nature of the initial fragments can change depending 
on each specific case. To model the molecule C2H2, Mulliken can just as easily consider a 
fragment “C2” and another “H4” of adapted symmetries.
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We could  express  this  insight  in  a  mereological  principle:  Constituent  atoms  of 
molecules are not parts of those molecules when we look at the total entity in the light of 
molecular orbitals. Unlike chair parts which preserve their material properties whether in the 
chair or on the bench. Nor are they parts in the sense that buckets of water are parts of the 
ocean. 
However, parts of chairs, atoms and the contents of buckets of water are extracted 
from the wholes of which they are parts by some procedure. Looked at from the point of 
view of the whole, chairs, molecules and oceans afford things; looked at from the point of 
view of their constituent parts they are potentialities, not the things that are thereby afforded.
A mereological  study  must  take  account  of  the  interaction  of  the  whole  with  its 
environment and should not artificially isolate it from the external world. Earley’s study of a 
mereology of chemical systems is important because the chemical entities are defined by their 
capacities to act on their medium. For even thinking the relation between a molecule and its 
parts, it is necessary to take account of the capacities of this molecule to act on the external 
world. A chemist generally seeks criteria that can be used to foresee the existence and the 
geometry of transition states and those of the products given those of the reactants. This is the 
goal of molecular theories of reactivity. Mulliken proposes static indexes to study molecular 
reactivity such as the atomic charges for the prediction of ionic or dipolar reactions, others 
propose the free valence index for radical reactions. Successive approximations justified by 
their  context of use make it  possible to include the behavior of the reagents according to 
various types of control (steric, electric, frontier orbital) expressed by the Klopman-Salem 
equation to determine the energy of interaction. In parallel, the dynamic approach to reactivity 
uses indexes which characterize the response of a molecule to the approach of a reagent. An 
example of dynamic index of reactivity is the π-electrons localization energy on an atom in a 
molecule. But those atomic indexes are afforded by the molecular whole interacted with the 
surroundings.
This capacity to enter into extra-molecular relations makes it  possible to study the 
chemical properties of atomic aggregates but also accounts for the molecular form i.e. of the 
internal  relations  between  the  molecule  and  its  “parts”.  In  addition,  the  striking  analogy 
between chemical properties and quantum observables is a line of work that could pave the 
way for a new mereological approach to chemical systems. Are there atoms in a molecule? 
Does this question admit an answer similar to that brought by Earley concerning salt in sea 
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water?  In  the  light  of  our  arguments,  it  seems  that  Mulliken  and  Earley  offer  parallel 
arguments.  Molecules  afford  atoms  in  the  context  of  certain  manipulations  as  studies  of 
molecular reactivity have shown us. The material content of a molecule can only be a fusion 
of atomic potentials, not of atoms.  
Affordances are not simple conditional properties. This is because they incorporate the 
procedure or method used to display their empirical manifestations.
The  conclusion  from  this  analysis  is  that  an  `atom’  in  the  molecular  orbital 
framework of concepts is mereologically like a single sodium ionic core in Earley’s sea, that 
is it affords salt or in appropriate circumstances, soap, as a proper part of a structured whole, 
or it affords sodium as a widely distributed element. 
Continuous and discontinuous substances as wholes
Since the end of the eighteenth century the idea that chemistry is the study of the qualitative 
transformations  of  continuous  substances  has  been  displaced  until  recently  by  the  simple 
atomic hypothesis. The mereology of continuous substances does not fit the logic of classes 
and their  members,  set  theory,  as worked out mereologically,  by David Lewis  (1991)  for 
example. Taking the sea as a continuous substance we can say it is a fusion of trillions of 
buckets full, how many depends on the size of the bucket. It can be considered as a fusion of a 
dozen or so oceans and seas, or as a fusion of so many drops from an eye dropper and so on. 
These scale-different fusions illustrate the transitivity of the part-whole relation.
However, atoms of disparate kinds do not make up molecules in the way that members 
of sets make up sets, though they are the parts of such molecules (neglecting diatomic and 
polyatomic molecules for the moment). Nor do atoms of the same kind make up elements in 
that way either, though the stuff, sodium, has sodium atoms as parts, and blocks of it can be 
kept anhydrously in a vat of paraffin. Horses make up the set of all horses in yet another way, 
since horses never fuse into larger equine entities in the way that sodium atoms fuse into 
larger blocks of sodium. Band theory based on quantum chemistry considers a crystal to be a 
whole in which atoms lose their identity. This opens up yet another dimension in which the C-
mereology looks in need of supplementation. So there seem to be two notions of mereological 
fusion at work in chemistry. 
We are forced to conclude therefore that a new set of mereological rules is required 
for the logic of chemical discourses. It is neither wholly a C- nor wholly an S-mereology. 
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The new mereology requires a revision of the basic principles that are definitive of each of 
the metrologies set out above. 
In  classical  mereology  the  Principle  of  Unique  Composition  runs  up  against 
conclusion that the parts of chemical wholes like molecules and atoms are affordances not 
themselves concrete entities. However, those same atoms which Mulliken’s approximation 
transforms into affordances are the parts of elements as fusions, that is obey the Unique 
Composition Principle. It seems to us that Transitivity of the Part-Whole Relation as defined 
in  C-mereology  does  hold  because  electron  affordances  are  parts  of  atoms,  and  atom 
affordances are parts of molecules, electron affordances are parts of molecules. That is the 
conclusion to be drawn from Mulliken’s demonstration of the power of the molecular orbital 
set. Nevertheless, transferring the Principle of the Transitivity of the Part-Whole relation to 
the S-mereology also appears to be viable. An electron-singleton is a subset of a certain set 
of  electrons,  just  as  a  neutron-singleton  is  a  subset  of  a  certain  set  of  neutrons  and  a 
positron-singleton is a subset of a certain set of positrons, and these sets are subsets of an 
atom as a set  of  subatomic objects.  An `atom’ is  a   subset  of a  set  of  atoms,  that  is  a 
molecule, in the same way as its subatomic parts are subsets of itself a set. 
Where  do  the  C-mereology  and  S-mereology  part  company  as  grammars  for 
chemical  discourses?  So  far  as  we  can  see  –  nowhere.  Provided  we  are  willing  to 
countenance  `disparate  sets’,  membership  of  which  is  determined  by  a  quite  complex 
relation between the functionality of parts and the object  as superset they comprise we can 
think with Lesniewski or with Lewis. 
Fugitive Constituents and the Parts in  Dissipative Structures.
A candle flame,  such as  that  which was the subject  of  Faraday’s  famous lecture,  is  a 
dissipative structure because it is continuously self-identical as a sum of processes.  There 
are many molecular level processes which are parts of the macro process, the flame as a 
bounded dissipative structure. From this point of view the mereology of Faraday’s candle 
flame is unproblematic (Earley. 2005).  However, from another point of view, that of ionic 
cores as constituents of material beings as their sums, C-mereology does not seem to be a 
good fit. The material constituents of a flame or any other bounded dissipative structure are 
continuously changing as more wax molecules interact with more oxygen molecules drawn 
in to the flame, but at each spatial location the same reactions are occurring. The products, 
mainly carbon dioxide and water pass out of the flame. Let us call these molecules `fleeting 
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parts’. A flame is a Whole of which the Parts are processes. How does the necessity for 
fleeting parts fit with the necessity for a process ontology? This problem has been addressed 
in the past. A rainbow is an optical phenomenon produced by the refraction and internal 
refection  of  light  from  a  point  source  in  rain  drops.  Theodoric  of  Freiburg,  in  his 
experimental study of the phenomenon, realised that he could treat the rain shower as a 
dissipative structure, because the rain drops were succeeding one another in the rain shower 
sufficiently quickly to allow for the modelling of the shower by a stationary array of watery 
spheres. The rain drops are fleeting parts of a dissipative structure. S-mereology seems to fit 
the concept of fleeting constituent well. There is a many membered set of raindrops at a 
certain location in the shower – just as there is a set of oxygen atoms at certain location in 
the flame. It is this set that is a constituent as a subset of the superset that is the flame.
Chemistry  also  makes  use  of  `ephemeral’ individuals  as  parts  of  wholes.  For 
instance, the swiftly composing and decomposing hydrogen-oxygen structures of which real 
water is really composed are ephemeral individuals. Water is made up of these beings. As 
such they are constituents of a certain whole. Here is another mereological set-up for which 
neither C-mereology nor S-mereology seems well adapted as discourse grammars.  
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